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Flagrant Police Abuse: Why Black
Lives (Also) Matter to the Fourth
Amendment
Joelle Anne Moreno*
Constitutionalrights pivot on problems of proof But traditional
academic distinctions between "procedural" rules of evidence and
"substantive" questions of constitutional law impede our understanding
of how law works. In particular,how law works to identify, constrain, and
remedy police abuse of constitutional rights.i Treating rights and
remedies as abstractconcepts ignores the fact that the exclusionary rule
functions as a rule of evidence.2 In theory, remedies are the life force of
rights.3 In practice, constitutional violations are currently remediable
only if a defendant can prove that he suffered intentionalpolice abuse or
prove that a police officer knew but ignored constitutionalconstraints.4

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38D21RH93
Copyright © 2016 Reagents of University of California
* Associate Dean for Research & Professor of Law, Florida International University
College of Law.
1 See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1891 (2014) (noting that the legal literature "has often treated exclusionary issues at a
high level of abstraction").
2 See Arnold H. Loewy, Police Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used
Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1989) (providing a prescient and pragmatic perspective
on the functional relationship between substance and procedure).
3 Professor Andrew E. Taslitz thoughtfully addresses the fundamental rights function
of the exclusionary rule. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy:
Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO L. REV. 419, 430-31
(2013) ("The instrumental function of rights is to give their bearers access to certain
benefits to which society deems them entitled .

. .

. In the case of the Fourth Amendment,

a defendant's desired instrumental value is exclusion of evidence against him at trial, thus
making it harder, occasionally impossible, to convict him of a crime.").
4 Although the justices rarely consider real world evidentiary hurdles when establishing
constitutional standards, Justice Ginsburg specifically noted that defendants will struggle
to satisfy the increasingly burdensome suppression standard. See Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In her view, "[e]ven when
deliberate or reckless conduct is afoot, the Court's assurance will often be an empty
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The problem ofproving thatpolice officers act with demonstrably
culpable intent is also at the core of the Black Lives Matter cases. The
growing number of acquittals and grandjury non-indictmentsfollowing
the police-custody and police-seizure deaths of Michael Brown,5 Eric
Garner,6 Freddie Gray,7 Tamir Rice,8 and other victims of police
violence9 reveals that judges and juries refuse to believe that police
officers are culpable lawbreakers. Preventing and resolving these cases

promise: How is an impecunious defendant to make the required showing? If the answer
is that a defendant is entitled to discovery (and if necessary, an audit of police
databases . . . then the Court has imposed a considerable administrative burden on courts
and law enforcement." Id.
5 Erin McClam, Ferguson Cop Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Shooting of Michael
Brown,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Nov.
25,
2014,
2:21
AM),
http:/www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/ferguson-cop-darrenwilson-not-indicted-shooting-michael-brown-n25539 1.
6 In December 2014, a Staten Island grand jury delivered a vote of "no true bill" after
finding no probable cause that a crime was committed by Officer Daniel Pantaleo. See
Andrew Siff et al., Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner

Chokehold

Death,

NBC

NEW

YORK

(Dec.

4,

2014,

1:59

PM)

http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Grand-Jury-Decision-Eric-Garner-Staten-

Island-Chokehold-Death-NYPD-284595921.html#ixzz4FQtOAneL. However, a federal
grand jury began hearing evidence of alleged civil rights violations in February 2016. Al
Baker & Eli Rosenberg, Federal Grand Jury Begins HearingEvidence in Eric Garner

Case,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Feb.

11,

2016),

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/1 1/nyregion/federal-grand-jury-begins-hearingevidence-in-eric-garner-case.html?_r=0.
7 Of the six officers charged in Mr. Gray's death in police custody, three officers were
acquitted of all charges, including one for murder, and one officer's trial ended in a hung
jury. Kevin Rector, Judge acquits Lt. Brian Rice of all charges in Freddie Gray case,
BALT. SUN (July 18, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddiegray/bs-md-ci-rice-verdict-20160718-story.html; Sarah Almukhtar et al., Freddie Gray
Case Ends With No Convictions of Any Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES (updated July 27,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/30/us/what-happened-freddie-grayarrested-by-baltimore-police-department-map-timeline.html.
s Mark Berman, Grandjurors in the Tamir Rice case voted that the shooting was
justified, did not vote on specific criminal charges, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/20/grand-jurors-in-thetamir-rice-case-voted-that-shooting-was-justified-did-not-vote-on-specific-criminalcharges/?utmjterm=.b45d0ba8fe4e; Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland
Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiingcleveland.html? r=0.
9
See
Fatal
Force,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
13,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016
(collecting
police shooting data, including a brief description of facts and information about correct
outcomes).
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may be further complicated by a "Ferguson Effect, "to causing public
distrust of police and police fear and disinterest especially in minority
urban communities. The long-term implications of these new
developments on national and local strategiesfor policing the police are
manifold and uncertain. The short-term lessons are clear and should be
obvious. Over the past decade, the Roberts Court has expanded police
authority and reduced Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable police abuse by repeatedly refusing to recognize police
aggression as remediable. In each new case, most recently in Utah v.
Strieff 11 the defendant seeking to suppress even obviously illegally-seized
evidence faces the insurmountable burden of proving the police officers
acted intentionally, recklessly, or with gross negligencel2 under the
Roberts Court's increasingly stringent 'flagrant police abuse
standard. "13
The flagrantpolice abuse suppression standard hypothesizes the
possibility that the average criminal defendant could gather proof
sufficient to convince a judge that a police officer acted: (1) illegally and
(2) with the necessary mentally culpability. But each new Fourth
Amendment decision from the Court ignores the reality repeatedly
uncovered in the Black Lives Matter cases. If as the Black Lives Matter
cases prove, prosecutors' offices with their resources, access, and
institutionalpolice connections cannot prove that officers break the law,
what hope is therefor the average criminal defendant?
The exclusionary rule celebrated its centenary just three years
ago.14 But Strieff is the latest example of the Court's dangerous new
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that incentivizes aggressive policing
(including suspicion-less police seizures), ignores obvious obstacles to
defense proof of police wrongdoing, and invites prosecutors to feast on

1o Louis Beckett, Is the 'Ferguson effect' real? Researcher has second thoughts, THE
GUARDIAN
(May
16,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/may/13/ferguson-effect-real-researcher-richard-rosenfield-second-thoughts.
ii Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. _ (2016).
12 Herring, 555 U.S. at 143-144 (finding that "evidence should be suppressed only if it
can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment" and
that exclusion requires defense proof of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence").
13 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *8 (holding that suppression was unwarranted because the
officer's illegal seizure was "an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in
connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected drug house.").
14

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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the illegalfruit of police abuse of fundamental rights. s
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4. Ignoring the Evidence: Policing the Police................. 62

Jon B. Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315, 333 (2004); David A.
Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce or Replace the Fourth
15

Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 154 (2009) (citing a 2004
field study of police adherence to search and seizure standards conducted by Jon B. Gould
and Stephen D. Mastrofski which concluded that observed "Fourth Amendment
violations, some quite egregious, showed up in almost a third ofall ofthe observedpolice
investigations."); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87

NOTRE DAME L. REv. 585, 611 (2011) (describing research showing that "15% of police
officers interviewed admitted they would intentionally conduct an illegal search ...
[which] probably understates the extent to which police willfully violate the Fourth
Amendment, since it is an admission against interest"); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven
Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 540
(2013) (citing studies involving "observation of police officers on patrol that found that
46% of pat-down searches were unconstitutional"); Taslitz, supra note 3, at 419-20
("Empirical data and psychological and economic theory establish ...
[that] law
enforcement violations of Fourth Amendment protections are numerous, and the
obstacles to alternative remedies so great as to render them largely meaningless.").
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INTRODUCTION

Prior to ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton
recognized the centrality of search and seizure protections.16 Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams similarly opined that colonists' anger and fear
over unreasonable searches and seizures catalyzed the American
Revolution.17 Over two centuries later, the Roberts Court began its

16 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 57 (N.Y. Univ. Press, 2006).
17 According to the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886):
"In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution under the terms 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' it is only
necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the controversies on the
subject, both in this country and in England. The practice in the colonies of issuing writs
of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search
suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;' since they placed 'the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.' This was in February, 1761, in
Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most prominent event
which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country.
'Then and there,' said John Adams, 'then and there was the first scene of the first act of
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approbation of illegal investigatory tactics through the creation of a new
flagrant police abuse standard in Herringv. United States.is Interestingly,
it was the deliberate decision to place the word "flagrant" at the fulcrum
of its new suppression standard that enabled justices, who routinely use
language to change law, to begin to use law to change language.
Flagrant, derived from the Medieval Latin flagrantem, originally
meant "ablaze."19 In virtually every other context, flagrant continues to
mean both "obvious" and "intentional."20 Only in the Roberts Court's
contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has the definition of
flagrant been truncated and the word used solely as a synonym for
intentional.
Starting with Herring, the Court redefined flagrant as deliberate
law breaking, although a mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence
could also suffice.21 The Court recently reaffirmed these stringent
suppression requirements. In Strieff, the Court held that even a concededly
illegal suspicion-less seizure is not flagrant, for suppression purposes,
because, "[flor the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct

opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence
was born."
is It is worth noting that much of what seemed new in Herring actually appeared 16
years earlier in a prescient but uncited law review article written by Professors Thomas
and Pollack. See George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the Fourth
Amendment Scales: The Bad Faith "Exception" to Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 21, 41-42 (1993). These authors anticipated an exclusionary rule bad faith
standard "requiring a minimum mental state of recklessness," or in the alternative
defense proof of "ongoing and systematic violations of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
However, they notably diverged from the HerringCourt in their opinion that juries, not
judges, should decide all Fourth Amendment violation questions because "[g]iving juries
the power to decree that the police have acted in bad faith is one small, but symbolically
significant, way of putting the community in charge of the police." See id. at 60.
19

Flagrant,

OXFORD

ENGLISH

DICTIONARY,

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/70958?redirectedFrom=flagrant#eid
3,

2016);

Flagrant,

ONLINE

(last visited Aug.

ETYMOLOGY

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=flagrant&allowedinjframe=0
Aug. 23, 2016).
20

Flagrant,

OXFORD

ONLINE

4,

2016);

Flagrant, MERRIAM

WEBSTER

ONLINE,

(last visited
DICTIONARY,

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/flagrant
Aug.

DICTIONARY,

(last visited

http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/flagrant (last visited Aug. 23, 2016).
21 Herring, 555 U.S. at 143-44 (suppression requires defense proof of police "deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence").
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is required than the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure."22 Strieff
builds on the Herring Court's conclusion that "suppression is not an
automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation"23 by clarifying
that evidence of an obvious and apparent police abuse of rights is
insufficient. Since Herring, the Court has justified the requirement of
defense proof of police mental state with the opaque argument that "the
[suppression] question turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct."24 However, the
argument that behavior modification is more efficacious when the
conduct one seeks to deter is more intentional is empirically unsupported
and contrary to common sense, everyday experience, and the entire body
of torts law.25

The Court's recent shift from flagrant as obvious to flagrant as
intentional has escaped the attention of legal commentators, despite three
profound effects of this "bait and switch" on law and practice. First, it
covertly and dramatically increases the quantum of defense suppression
proof. In the pre-Herringpast, defendants could establish that a search or
seizure was obviously illegal using the type of evidence typically
available to them, their own eyewitness account of what police officers
did and said. But because police officers rarely announce that they intend
to break or disregard the law, defendants' eyewitness testimony will be

23

Strieff, 579 U.S. at *9.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.

24

Id.

22

An analysis of police and the efficacy of the Supreme Court's efforts to deter police
misconduct is beyond the scope of this Article. Currently, it may be beyond the scope of
any article because little empirical research has ever been published on this question.
Despite the lack of a real-world evidence base, the Court continues to simply presume
that exclusion effectively deters at least some police misconduct. As Justice Blackmun
complained 32 years ago in United States v. Leon, the assumption that police officers can
be deterred "rests on untested predictions about police conduct." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 927-28 (1984). See also Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the
Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 821, 856 (2013) ("Until the Court is
willing to treat the exclusionary rule like other remedies and balance the deterrent
function with additional priorities, it is left to fashion an exclusionary remedy relying
exclusively on the empirically unanswerable questions surrounding deterrence."); Jerry
E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33
WAKE FORESTL. REV. 261, 272 (1998) ("If one were to study the deterrence justification
by interviewing convicted burglars, one would conclude that the threat of punishment
does not deter at all."); Alfredo Garcia, Toward an Integrated Vision of Criminal
ProceduralRights: A Counter to Judicialand Academic Nihilism, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 1,
16 (1993) ("[T]he defense of exclusion on the basis of its deterrent effect suffers from
similar logical and empirical flaws.").
25
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either insufficient or, as the Black Lives Matter cases repeatedly
demonstrate, unpersuasive.26 Second, it rejects relevant precedent. The
flagrant police abuse standard as understood and applied by the current
Court requires judges to delve into the minds of individual officers, an
inquiry inconsistent with the Court's longstanding view that police
officers' "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary ... Fourth
Amendment

analysis."27

Third,

it ignores

reality.

The

Court's

exclusionary jurisprudence rests on speculations about hypothetical
suppression hearings that bear little resemblance to real world courts. As
noted above, the consistent pattern of acquittals and grand jury nonindictments in the Black Lives Matter cases demonstrate that judges and
juries are overwhelmingly reluctant to hold police officers mentally
accountable for their aggressive, violent, or deadly conduct, even in the
face of videotaped evidence.28
Strieff arrives at a time when the challenges of policing and of
policing the police have entered a new period of crisis.29 The "Ferguson
Effect," which the criminologist Richard Rosenfeld described in his June
14, 2016 report for the U.S. Department of Justice,30 attributes a recent

26 In Herring, the Court also suggested that exclusion could be warranted if the
defendants provided adequate proof of systemic negligence. 555 U.S. at 157 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). However, as Justice Ginsburg persuasively argued in her dissent, this was
an "empty promise." Id. Defendants lack the resources for this type of discovery, and,
even if they could pursue discovery, in most cases there would be no evidence to review
because police departments have no incentive to maintain these records. Id.
27 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
28 The December 2014 grand jury non-indictment following Eric Garner's death, which
was captured on videotape, surprised many New Yorkers including Mayor Bill de Blasio.
See Amy Davidson, What the Eric Garner Grand Jury Didn't See, THE NEW YORKER
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/eric-garner-grand-jurydidnt-see.
29 For an interesting study suggesting that police officers are, in fact, different from
other government actors because they experience more intrinsic satisfaction when other
people are punished, see Richard H. McAdams et al, The Law of Police, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 135, 148 (2015) ("Now we can offer a simple explanation of the doctrinal distinction
between police and other governmental actors. Even if many factors influence the
decision to become a police officer, police are likely more punitive than other
governmental actors or the public, and therefore they likely have lower thresholds of
doubt for searches and seizures. Thus, police require more judicial monitoring and
scrutiny than other governmental actors.").
30 According to Professor Rosenfeld: "What has become known as the 'Ferguson effect'
on the homicide increase, as noted, is subject to considerable controversy and evidencefree rhetoric. The term is also unfortunate, because it does not only apply to the police
killing in Ferguson and because its precise meaning is unclear. The dominant de-policing
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increase in homicides to a loss of trust in the police, especially in urban
and racial and ethnic minority communitieS.31 Discussions of the
existence or extent of any Ferguson Effect frequently include
controversial causal speculations and allocation of blame to police
departments and/or protesters.32 Putting aside questions of causation and
responsibility that currently have no clear answer, Professor Rosenfeld's
Justice Department report provides new and reliable evidence that recent
unchecked public-police fear can have violent and even deadly
consequences.
These problems should be apparent to members of the Supreme
Court whose decisions are not made in a media vacuum. Decisions about
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies are not theoretical or abstract. In
fact, the justices have long acknowledged the impact of their decisions on
policing33 because, without constitutional constraints, for police officers
who "'engage[] in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,'
[it] raises the temptation to cut constitutional corners."34 Ultimately, it is
police organizations that must respond to incentives and deterrents
through training and internal controls, which makes the Court's repeated
focus on individual officers confusing and counter-productive. Some
knowledge of real-world policing clarifies the socio-normative
jurisprudential obligations on the Court to anticipate, prevent, condemn,
and remedy illegal police abuse of constitutionally protected rights.

interpretation is that highly publicized incidents of police use of deadly force against
minority citizens, including but not limited to the Ferguson incident, caused police
officers to disengage from their duties, particularly proactive tactics that prevent crime."
RICHARD ROSENFELD, NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENTING AND EXPLAINING THE

2015

HOMICIDE

RISE:

RESEARCH

DIRECTIONS

(2016),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/249895.pdf.
31 Id. at 18-23.
32 Heather MacDonald, The New Nationwide Crime Wave, WALL ST. J. JOURNAL (May
29, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-nationwide-crime-wave1432938425; Matt Ford, Debunking the Ferguson Effect, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/1 1/ferguson-effect/416931/.
33

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) ("The tendency of those who

execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused
persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal
Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged
at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.")
34

Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 374 (1998).

(Souter, J. dissenting) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914).
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On the current Court, Justice Sotomayor increasingly speaks truth
to power35 by interjecting real-world policing problems, expressing
concern for targeted populations, and seeking to preserve judicial
integrity. In this role and context, Justice Sotomayor appears to be an
intellectual heir to Justice Louis D. Brandeis who famously argued that
the social and political role of the Court is to lead and teach by moral
example.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.36
Justice Sotomayor aligned herself with Justice Brandeis when she
warned of similar risks in her Strieff dissent:
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are "isolated." They are the canaries in the coal mine
whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this
atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops
corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices
matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.37
When Justice Sotomayor wrote "no one can breathe," she
repeated Eric Garner's dying words which have become a rallying cry for
the "Black Lives Matter" movement.38 Her powerful call to arms is a grim
reminder that victims of violent or deadly police abuse are
disproportionately young minority men. As Justice Sotomayor is
undoubtedly aware, litigation resulting from New York City's stop-andfrisk program39 has recently substantiated (with extensive empirical
evidence) the fact that minority groups are also disproportionally targeted
for less intrusive interference with constitutional libertieS.4o But Justice

35 Jade Greear, Speaking Truth to Power, Huffington Post (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jade-greear/speaking-truth-topower_2_b_8824094.html
36 Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928).
37 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *12 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
38 Ray Sanchez, Police Chokehold Death Sparks New York Protest March, CNN (Dec.
8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/23/us/new-york-choke-hold-rally/.
39 Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
40 New York City announced on January 31, 2014 that it would settle its long-running
legal fight over N.Y.P.D. stop and frisk practices and implement many of the specific
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Sotomayor's warnings are aimed at a Court that is apparently immune to
appeals to racial, ethnic, and social justice. A Court impervious to, if not
complicit in, the police illegality it repeatedly condones by effectively
ignoring police illegality and aggression by making blatant police abuse
virtually irremediable.41
The exclusionary remedy, created over 100 years ago, once
symbolized our moral commitment to lawful police investigations that
respected privacy, property, and basic human dignity.42 By 1961, when
Mapp v. Ohio was decided, exclusion was considered a vital component
of our Fourth Amendment protections, if not a constitutional command.43
Over the past half century, exclusion has lost its constitutional luster.
Today the remedy is reserved only for defendants who can prove "police
conduct . . . sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by

reforms identified in Judge Scheindlin's decision. Benjamin Weiser, Mayor Says New
York City Will Settle Suits on Stop and Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/3 1/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.
Mayor
Bill de Blasio's announcement was viewed as a dramatic reversal of the policies of the
previous administration, which had credited a drop in violent crime to the same stop-andfrisk practices. Id..; see also Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop and Frisk
Policy, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
12,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rightsjudge-rules.html; Katherine Macfarlane, New York's Stop-and-Frisk Appeals are Still
Alive, BROOK.

L.

SCH.

PRACTICUM (2013),

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2370556
(essay exploring the
possible effects of Judge Scheindlin's decision): Similar examples can be found outside
of New York. . U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE

4,
8
(2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2014/NPD%20Findings%20Report.p
df (finding that New Jersey Police Department stops have routinely violated the Fourth
Amendment).
41 http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-the-despicable-anddispensable-exclusionary-rule/ (noting the "long line of cases . . [where] the Court has
refused to exclude evidence in various situations in which evidence found in or after an
unconstitutional search").
42
As Justice Breyer observed in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 629-30 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting),
Our Fourth Amendment traditions place high value upon protecting privacy in the home.
They emphasize the need to assure that its constitutional protections are effective, lest the
Amendment sound the word of promise to the ear but break it to the hope. They include
an exclusionary principle, which since Weeks has formed the centerpiece of the criminal
law's effort to ensure the practical reality of those promises.
43 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
DEPARTMENT
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the justice system."44
The text of the Fourth Amendment remains unchanged. But over
time, irremediable rights become ephemeral. By severely restricting
access to exclusion, the Court has changed the nature and scope of
constitutional protections. This concern transcends defendants confronted
with illegally seized evidence at trial or during plea negotiations. It affects
everyone who blithely assumes that the Bill of Rights protects against
unlawful privacy intrusions and aggressive and illegal police abuse.
This article links the evolving suppression doctrine to the recent
Black Lives matter cases to demonstrate the interrelationship between the
Roberts Court's jurisprudence and contemporary challenges that face
anyone seeking to prove police culpability. Part I explores the
constitutional evolution of the flagrant police abuse suppression standard
including its most recent application to a concededly illegal seizure in
Utah v. Strieff. Part II examines the problem of proving flagrant police
abuse by contemplating the lessons of the Black Lives Matter cases. Part
III critically evaluates recent efforts by the Roberts Court to map its
increasingly stringent general suppression jurisprudence onto the
preexisting, distinct, and more particularized doctrine of attenuation. Part
IV locates this analysis within a more global understanding of the social,
normative, and educational role of the Supreme Court as articulated
nearly a century ago in the personal jurisprudence of Justices Brandeis
and echoed today in decisions by Justice Sotomayor. The article
concludes by denouncing our legal academic tradition of elevating
explorations of theory at the cost of practice analysis. In virtually every
area of inquiry, this is an artificial, unhelpful, and distracting divide. In
the context of constitutional rights and remedies, theory arguments must
incorporate an understanding of real police practices, evidentiary burdens,
and the dangers to judicial integrity, social justice, and personal privacy.
When theory and practice are properly integrated, evidence of police
officer acquittals and non-indictments reveal flaws that should be fatal to
the current Court's theoretical speculations about the nature and operation
of Fourth Amendment guarantees. Especially in this context, theory is
epistemic only when it aids, illuminates, or organizes thinking; but theory
repeatedly contradicted by actual evidence is prattle, philosophy, or
politics.
II. FLAGRANT POLICE ABUSE
44

Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
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A. The Current Suppression Standard: Utah v. Strieff
In June 2016, the Court decided Utah v. Strieff. The facts of this
new case are simple. For the past half-century, since Terry v. Ohio,45
police officers must have reasonable suspicion based on specific and
articulable facts to stop anyone suspected of a crime.46 In December 2006,
an anonymous tipster called the Salt Lake City Police Department to
report suspected drug activity at a particular house.47 Officer Douglas
Fackrell conducted intermittent surveillance for approximately three
hours over the course of the following week.48 While observing the house,
Fackrell saw Edward Strieff leave and walk to a nearby convenience store.
The officer followed and immediately seized Strieff by ordering him to
stop in the store's parking lot.49 Fackrell asked for identification. After
Strieff had been seized without suspicion, the officer learned from police
dispatch of an outstanding warrant for a minor traffic violation.5o The
officer placed Strieff under arrest and, during the search of his clothing
incident to arrest, discovered a bag of methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia.51
Officer Fackrell's actions were unlawful because, as he conceded,
he did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Strieff. Strieff
unsuccessfully argued that the evidence should be suppressed and Justice
Thomas, writing for a five-justice majority, easily agreed that exclusion
was unwarranted. The short Strieff decision analyzed the legality of the
search by examining the purpose and flagrancy of Officer Fackrell's
conduct and whether the subsequent discovery of an outstanding warrant
attenuated the search from the initial illegal seizure. Strieff purports to
uphold precedent, but the opinion balances precariously on two legally
and logically dubious conclusions: (1) a new variant on the evolving
flagrant police abuse standard; and (2) counterfactual conclusions about
actual police abuse. As discussed in more detail below, the Strieff Court
also unpersuasively attempts to map its general suppression jurisprudence
onto the distinct and more particularized doctrine of attenuation.
B. The Development of the Flagrant Police Abuse Standard
1. The Roberts Court Creates a New Suppression

45
46
47

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Id. at 21.
Strieff, 579 U.S. at *2.

49

Id.
Id.

5o

Id.

si

Id.
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Standard
As noted above, the flagrant police abuse standard used by the
Strieff Court first appeared in Herring v. United States.52 Herring
spawned a plethora of commentary and piscine puns,53 but general
academic grumbling about the disappearing exclusionary rule uniformly
overlooked the Court's clever linguistic manipulations.54 Starting with
Herring, a majority of the Court transformed the operative constitutional
language by inserting a single ambiguous word into the new suppression
standard. In Herring, the Court focused on the fact that an "assessment of
the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the
[exclusion] calculus."55 Two years later, the Davis Court emphasized that
suppression "focus[es] the inquiry on the flagrancy of the police
misconduct at issue."56 Most recently, the Strieff majority deemed
suppression unwarranted based on the "especially significant [finding]

Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark Term
Paper? 7 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 463 (2009); Kenneth Earl, So Long and Thanks for All
the Herring: The U.S. Exclusionary Rule after Herring and What the United States Can
Learn from the Canadian Exclusionary Rule, 31 WIsc. INT'L L. J. 296 (2013); Wayne R.
LaFave, The Smell of Herring:A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRINM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009); Jennifer E. Laurin,
Trawling for Herring: Lessons in DoctrinalBorrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 670 (2011).
54 Many commentators found Herring obviously and immediately problematic. See,
e.g., Michael Vitiello, Herring v. United States: Mapp's "Artless" Overruling? 10NEV.
L.J. 164, 165 (2009) ("Herring goes much further and points towards a much greater
tolerance towards police misconduct because it allows the use of illegally seized
evidence, unless it was the product of at least reckless conduct on the part of the police.
If the Court, in fact, follows Herring's logic and extends that rule to all searches, the
Court will have adopted a rule without precedential support."); Claire Angelique Nolasco
et al., What HerringHath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring Cases in the Federal
Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 223-24 (2011)("Critics argue that the Herring decision
has weakened the exclusionary rule, disregarded the rationale behind the good-faith
doctrine, and effectively narrowed the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence only
pursuant to systemic negligence and to flagrant and reckless violations of the Fourth
Amendment.")
ss Herring, 555 U.S. at 143; see also Vitiello, supra note 54, at 168 ("Building on the
thesis of Judge Friendly's law review article on the exclusionary rule, the Court
contended that the exclusionary rule should be limited to "flagrant or deliberate"
violations of Fourth Amendment rights . . [thereby] [i]gnoring many Supreme Court
cases in which the Court suppressed evidence based on conduct that was arguably
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.").
56 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted).
52
53
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that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct."57 Thus, the Roberts Court's
flagrant police abuse suppression standard has evolved to the point that
concededly and patently illegal police misconduct is insufficiently
flagrant to merit suppression.
2. Defining "Flagrant"Police Abuse
What is "flagrant" police misconduct? The word appears at the
fulcrum of every modern exclusion case and over 55 times in the briefs
filed in Strieff.58 But not once in the voluminous pleadings, during oral
arguments, or in the Court's own opinions do the justices, the parties, or
amici attempt to define this pivotal word. Recent academic debate on the
vanishing exclusionary rule has been especially lively. But the Roberts
Court's decision to insert the word "flagrant" at the fulcrum of exclusion
has, until now, been overlooked.
Flagrant is an interesting word. As noted above, flagrantem
originally meant ablaze.59 This meaning was derived from the phrase,
flagrantredelicto, which describes a blazing crime and is evocatively and
most commonly used for the mid-act discovery of sexual misconduct.60
Thus, flagrant has always meant both "obvious" and "intentional."61 For
example, in an analogous non-jurisprudential context, the dual meaning
of "flagrant" recently motivated the NCAA Men's Basketball Rules
Committee to change its official nomenclature replacing "intentional
foul" with "flagrant foul."62 According to the NCAA, the change clarified
that its goal is to penalize players who engage in obvious fouls without
requiring officials to speculate about players' intent.63
Strieff, 479 U.S. at *9.
The number 55 includes only the number of times the exact adjective "flagrant" was
used throughout the briefs filed in Strieff The word in its inverse, adverb, or noun forms
(non-flagrant, flagrantly, and flagrancy) actually appears over 146 times throughout. See
id.
59 See definitions of "flagrant," supra notes 19-20.
60 See id.
61
See id..
62 The NFL, like the NCAA has deemphasized the question of the player's intent, noting
that "'[f]lagrant' in these rules does not necessarily imply malice on the part of the fouling
player or an intention to injure an opponent." NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2015 OFFICIAL
PLAYING
RULES
OF
THE
NAT'L
FOOTBALL
LEAGUE,
Preface (2015)
http://uaasnfl.blob.core.windows.net/live/1807/2015_nflrulebook-final.pdf.
63 Through their rules revision, the NCAA acknowledged a player's intent is often
difficult or impossible to discern, so "a player does not actually have to intend to make
the illegal contact for the official to assess the conduct as an intentional foul." NAT'L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2011-12 AND 2012-13 NCAA MEN'S BASKETBALL RULES
57
5s
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Redefining "Flagrant"as Intentional, but not
Obvious

.

The Roberts Court, unlike the college basketball court, has moved
in the opposite direction. Starting with Herring, the Court has repeatedly
used the word flagrant when it actually means intentional or mentally
culpable.64 The Court's deliberately inaccurate usage becomes
increasingly apparent in each new case. This may be, as Linda
Greenhouse has observed, additional evidence that "the conservative
majority is permitting the court to become an agent of partisan warfare to
an extent that threatens real damage to the institution."65 It may also
demonstrate that "Chief Justice Roberts, who during his confirmation
hearings promised judicial restraint above all else, has presided over a
court that has been far too willing to undermine or discard longstanding
precedent."66 But politics aside, purporting to seek evidence of flagrant
misconduct, while actually demanding defense proof that a police officer
acted intentionally or with a culpable mental state of recklessness or gross
negligence creates real problems for both constitutional theory and
criminal practice.67 When flagrancy is defined as a hidden mental state it
becomes unknowable. As Professor Uviller presciently observed three
decades ago, "the distinction probably should not be cast in terms of
'flagrant' versus 'technical' transgressions of protected rights. .
[because] flagrancy is frequently in the eye of beholder-in this case,
a post facto judicial beholder to whom certain protections may seem
stronger or clearer than they appear to the deterable constable on the

CHANGES
(approved
May
23,
2011),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/rules/mbb/2011/2011MBBfinalrules.pdf; Greg Johnson, Rule
changes designed to reduce physical play, create offensive flow, NCAA.COM (Nov. 5,
2013),
http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2013-11-05/rule-changesdesigned-reduce-physical-play-create-offensive.
64 Herring was the first decision to conflate flagrant with intentional/culpable police
conduct in its characterization of precedent. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. According to
the Herring majority, "flagrant conduct was at issue in Mapp . . [but] since Leon, we
have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than this." Id.
65 Linda Greenhouse, Resetting the Post-Scalia Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 18,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/opinion/resetting-the-post-scalia-supremecourt.html.
66 The Activist Roberts Court 10 years in, N.Y. TIMEs (July 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/opinion/sunday/the-activist-roberts-court- 10years-in.html.
67 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. at 238.

FALL 2016
FALI, 2016

MORENO
MIORENO

52

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W

Vol. 21:2

scene."68
C. Operating the Flagrant Police Abuse Standard
The Roberts Court regularly, if implausibly, claims that courts
deciding suppression motions use an objective police officer standard,
which limits the burden on the defendants to proof of "unreasonable"
police misconduct. For example, in Herring the majority protested that it
was not seeking "an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting
officers."69 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the Fourth Amendment
"good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances."70 Similarly in
Davis, the Court hypothesized that proof and counter-proof during the
suppression hearing focuses on the hypothetical police officer "act[ing]
with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is
lawful."71 These deliberate and inaccurate efforts to minimize the defense
burden of proof reflect a thinly veiled effort to align the evolving
suppression standard with preexisting doctrine.72
1. Distinguishingthe Leon Objective "Good Faith"
Standard
The Roberts Court's repeated claim that its flagrant police abuse
68 H. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution, 35 Vand.
L. Rev. 501, 514 (1982) (suggesting instead that the only workable distinction would be
between police mistakes of fact and of law). However, the Court resolved the mistake of
law question in 2014 in Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (holding that
reasonable suspicion for a stop could be based on a reasonable mistake of law).
69 Herring, 555 U.S. at 145.
70 Id. at 145 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 897, 922 n.23).
71 Id. (quotations omitted).
72 See Kinports, supra note 25, at 842 (noting that after Herring, "proof of recklessand certainly deliberate-misconduct envisions a subjective inquiry into the state of mind
of the actual officer whose actions are in question"); George M. Dery III, The "Bitter
Pill": The Supreme Court's Distaste for the Exclusionary Rule in Davis v. United
States Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible to Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U.C.R.
L.J. 1, 26 (2012) (noting that the problem with Herring was that the Court created a new
"inquiry [stripping away] the straightforward assessment of what a reasonable person
would do in a particular situation ... [and] leads to questions of intent and motivation of
a particular person and inquiry explicitly rejected by the court in Whren."); see also Orin
S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1105 (2011) (suggesting that "the Leon opinion made clear that the Court had in
mind an objective inquiry into costs and benefits: the proper inquiry was objective
reasonableness, not subjective good faith .... [However,] the phrase 'good faith' has led
some courts to assume that the good faith exception applies when an officer acts in
subjective good faith").
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standard merely applies United States v. Leon73 is especially
unconvincing. In Leon, the Court created a limited exception to the
probable cause requirement covering cases involving a police officer's
reasonable and "good faith"74 execution of a facially-valid warrant.75
Leon was a narrow decision that did not envision restricting remediable
Fourth Amendment violations to mentally culpable police misconduct.
On closer inspection, the differences between Leon and the postHerring suppression cases are greater than the similarities. First, in Leon
the prosecutor (the party most likely to have access to relevant evidence)
bore the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable police officer mental
state. Second, because Leon involved the execution of a search warrant,
the reviewing court had access to the documentary evidence necessary to
assess both the lack of probable cause and the facial validity of the warrant
(e.g., investigatory records, the affidavit, the warrant, and any other
paperwork generated by the issuing judge or magistrate).76 Third,

Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
Astute commentators have opined that Leon conflated two different "good faith"
standards because "the term, 'reasonable good-faith belief,' seems to be both objective
and subjective[;] . . . [t]hat is, the policeman must subjectively believe in the validity of
the warrant, and that belief must be objectively reasonable." Craig M. Bradley, The
Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in CriminalProcedure,76 MIss. L.J. 339, 353-54
(2006); see also Orin S. Kerr, supra note 72 at 1105 (suggesting that although "the Leon
opinion made clear that the Court had in mind an objective inquiry into costs and benefits:
the proper inquiry was objective reasonableness, not subjective good faith . . . [b]ut the
phrase 'good faith' has led some courts to assume that the good faith exception applies
when an officer acts in subjective good faith").
75 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (establishing an exception to the exclusionary rule based on
proof from the prosecution that a police officer acted in "objectively reasonable reliance"
on a "facially valid search warrant").
76 On its face, Leon is limited to warrant-based searches. Id. at 922. Under Leon, a
prosecutor seeking to establish reasonable police "good faith" following a search or
seizure executed pursuant to a warrant, can rely on a paper trail that invariably includes
the signed warrant and affidavit. Id. at 920-21. The paper trail is a vital component of the
prosecutor's proof because "[i]t is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether
the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting
in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 921. In fact, Leon
implicitly rejects any extension of the new good faith exception to warrantless searches
by finding that a "search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate . . . [it is] a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Id. at 913-14. Moreover, a 2012 study of over 700 federal appellate
court cases found that, prior to Herring, the Leon good faith exception was almost
exclusively applied in cases involving warrants. See Robert C. Hauhart & Courtney C.
Choi, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 316, 34373

74
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although Leon introduced a reasonable "good faith" search warrant
exception, the actual mental culpability of the police officer was wholly
irrelevant to the Court's analysis. Under Leon, the only question for a
court reviewing the "good faith" execution of a search warrant is whether
a reasonable police officer, after reading the warrant, would have found it
facially-valid and would have proceeded to execute the search.
2. DistinguishingProofof Objective and Subjective
Police Abuse of Rights
Deprived of legitimate Leon paternity, the Roberts Court must
take responsibility for creating a new flagrant police abuse standard that
appears to require defense proof of subjective, or at least partially
subjective, police officer bad faith.77 This expansion of the defense
suppression burden is revealed by an examination of evolving law and
existing practice.
First, the Fourth Amendment itself requires "reasonable" searches
and seizures. The Roberts Court claimed that it merely required proof of
unreasonable police misconduct. If that were true, the Court would have
been seeking evidence that was both unnecessary and redundant.
Second, more recent case law clearly reveals a demand that
defendants must prove subjective, or partly subjective police mental state.
For example, the Davis Court characterized the defendant's burden as
proving that the "officers who conducted the search . . . violate[d] Davis's
Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross
negligence."78 As Justice Alito suggested, there must be evidence of the
investigating officers' deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent states of
mind. In Herring,Justice Ginsburg raised the subjective evidence concern
in her dissent opining that "[it is not clear how the Court squares its focus
on deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of the
exclusionary rule does not require inquiry onto the mental state of the
46 (2012) (conducting an extensive study of 700 federal appellate cases applying Leon to
conclude that the cases only governed warrant-based searches).
77 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 ("As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct . . . ."); see also Claire Angelique
Nolasco, What HerringHas Wrought: An Analysis of Post-HerringCases in the Federal

Court, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 222-23 (2011). Though defendants can attempt to prove
that the illegality was the result of recurring or systemic police negligence, the Court's
suggestion that suppression could be obtained following proof of "systematic error" is
likely an empty promise because most defendants lack the resources for this type of
discovery and police departments have no incentive to maintain these types of records.
See Herring,555 U.S. at 150 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7s Davis, 564 U.S. at 240.
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police."79 More recently, Professor Kinports persuasively argued that "an
inquiry focused on the reasonable police officer with similar information
and experience might arguably retain the objectivity of a reasonableperson-under-all-the-circumstances test, [but] this is a negligence
standard."so This cannot jibe because the post-Herring Court has
consistently rejected the argument that proof of police negligence is
sufficient evidence for suppression.
Finally, there is a vast (if frequently overlooked) practical and
evidentiary difference between proving that a police officer acted
intentionally, recklessly, or with gross negligence and proving that an
abuse of rights was intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent. When
police officers investigate crimes their actions are virtually always
intentional, rather than accidental or mistaken. So it will never be difficult
for defense counsel to prove, for example, a police officer intended to
enter a dwelling, deliberately stopped a driver, or knowingly searched a
suspect's pockets. In contrast, proving an intentional, reckless, or grossly
negligent abuse of rights-especially post-Strieff which deemed an
obvious and conceded police illegality insufficient-will be virtually
impossible.si
Proof of mens rea is, of course, an element of virtually all criminal
laws. But we accept this heavy prosecution burden as a foundational
component of the presumption of innocence. In contrast, the Roberts
Court's decision to place an equally heavy burden on defendants seeking
suppression devalues fundamental Fourth Amendment protections and
ignores the realities of police investigations, discovery of evidence, and
criminal practice. Searches and seizures are rarely witnessed events,
police officers characteristically do not disclose to suspects their intent to
violate the constitution, and police officers who witness illegal police
conduct are unlikely to be cooperative and forthcoming. Thus, defendants
typically must rely on their own first-hand eyewitness accounts of police
misconduct, which are necessarily self-serving and may also be
incomplete or poorly-recalled.
3.

79

DistinguishingPrecedent

Herring, 555 U.S. at 157 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

so

See Kinports, supra note 25, at 842.
Under our exclusionary rule precedents, this acknowledged absence of police
culpability dooms Davis's claim. Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion
only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable
enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system. Davis, 564 U.S. at 240 (citing
si

Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
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The Court initially addressed the distinction between proof of
objective and subjective police intent two decades ago, in Whren v. United
States. In the well-known language of Whren, Justice Scalia opined that
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary ... Fourth Amendment
analysis."82 Eight years later, Justice O'Connor elaborated on the
complexities of proving subjective police intent in Missouri v. Siebert.83
According to Justice O'Connor, restricting suppression to "intentional
violations would require focusing constitutional analysis on a police
officer's subjective intent, an unattractive proposition that we all but
uniformly avoid."84 Justice O'Connor sensibly opined that police mental
culpability should be wholly irrelevant to the decision to admit or exclude
evidence because "[t]houghts kept inside a police officer's head cannot
affect that [suspect's] experience."85 Under these cases, a defendant
seeking suppression could rely on objectively ascertainable facts
witnessed by the defendant during the investigation and did not need to
prove police mental state. Proof of police intent was unnecessary because
a "suspect who experienced exactly the same [police abuse of rights] ...
save for a difference in the undivulged, subjective intent of the
interrogating officer . . . would not experience [it] any differently."86
III. FLAGRANT POLICE ABUSE ON THE STREETS
A. Exclusion as a Component of Judicial Integrity
As the exclusion doctrine has developed over time, the Court's
objectives have narrowed and solidified. When Mapp v. Ohio was decided
in 1961, the Court famously opined that exclusion was "an essential part
of the right to privacy."87 The Fourth Amendment "right to privacy,"
according to the Mapp Court, included the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence as a matter of constitutional principle and judicial integrity.
Suppression, according to the Mapp Court, would also teach state police
officers to respect constitutional limits when conducting criminal
investigations.ss Mapp incorporated the remedy of exclusion following
constitutional violation by state police, but many issues remained
unresolved. These included questions about the status of the remedy status
(e.g., Was it is a constitutional requirement or a judge-made rule?) and its

83

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 625-26 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

84

Id.

s5

Id. at 624-25.

86

Id.

82

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
ss Id. at 657.
87
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objectives (e.g., Did the remedy preserves the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system, protect courts from unreliable evidence, and/or deter
government law-breaking?). How the Court has answered or avoided
these questions over the past six decades provides insight into the justices'
shifting constitutional priorities and their evolving views on police
practices and criminal justice.
B. Exclusion as a Behavior Modification Tool
Although Mapp did not contain a balancing test, modern
suppression cases typically balance the "cost" of exclusion against the
"benefit" of police deterrence.89 The Court has wide latitude to advance
conceptual or theoretical objectives (e.g., competing approaches to textual
interpretation, conflicting views on the limits of congressional authority,
or alternative understandings of scope of the Free Exercise Clause). But
these are rhetorical frameworks that organize and prioritize interpretation
of a binding or guiding text, relevant and persuasive case law, pertinent
historical information, and arguments of logic and common sense.
Arguably the justices should be more constrained when they purport to
engage in behavior modification. Much has been written elsewhere (and
will not be repeated here) about the lack of empirical support for the
Roberts Court's repeated claim that intentional or otherwise mentally
culpably behavior is easier to deter. In the suppression context, the Court
purports to use its authority to deter police abuse of Fourth Amendment
rights. Because these are not rhetorical or theoretical objects, the Court
should operate from an evidence-based understanding of human behavior
and be accountable for the real-world consequences of its decision.
However, as Justice Sotomayor recently argued, the Court remains
willfully blind to its effects on policing and to the fact that "unlawful
police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives.9o
1. Ignoring the Consequences: Incentivizing Police

89 In Herring, the Court found that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct
must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." Herring,555
U.S. at 144. The HerringCourt also opined that, even if the application of the rule would
have some deterrent effect, the Court must additionally conclude that "the benefits of
deterrence must outweigh the costs." Id. at 145. In Davis, the Court found that "real
deterrent value is a necessary condition for exclusion, but it is not a sufficient one." Davis,
564 U.S. at 237. Most recently, in Strieff, the Court found "that, even when there is a
Fourth Amendment violation, this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of
exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits." Strieff, 579 U.S. at *1.
90 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *12 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
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Abuse
A Supreme Court that ignores evidence relevant to assessing the
effect of its decisions on police abuse of constitutional rights abnegates
its normative, social, and educational responsibilities. As Justice
Sotomayor recently opined, decisions from the Court withholding the
remedy of exclusion can (paradoxically) incentivize rather than deter
illegal searches and seizures because "condon[ing] officers' use of these
[investigatory] devices without adequate cause ... giv[es] them reason to
target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner."91 More specifically, Justice
Sotomayor has expressed her fear that the Strieff Court incentivized
aggressive policing that disproportionately affects poor, ethnic, and
minority communities because, in certain neighborhoods, police officers
will play the odds by assuming the existence of an outstanding warrant
insulating their illegal conduct from subsequent judicial scrutiny.92
2. Ignoring the Evidence: The FergusonEffect
New concerns that the Court's flagrant police abuse standard may
have long term deleterious consequences-especially on urban minority
communities-have recently been substantiated. In Professor Richard
Rosenfeld's June 2016 U.S. Department of Justice Report,93 2015 crime
data from 56 U.S. cities revealed a 17% overall increase in homicideS94
and a 33% increase in homicides in the top 10 cities.95 According to
Professor Rosenfeld, the evidence indicates "some version of the
Ferguson Effect."96 Professor Rosenfeld equivocates in his attribution of
fault to avoid aligning himself with either of the two controversial but
conflicting explanations for a Ferguson Effect.97 According to Professor
91

See id. at *10.

92

95

See id.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 30.
Id. at 5 -10.
Id. at 10-11.

96

Id. at 18; MurderRate Spike Could Be 'FergusonEffect', DOJ Study Says, NPR.COM

93
94

(June 15, 2016, 4:41 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/15/482123552/murder-ratespike-attributed-to-ferguson-effect-doj -study-says.
97 Professor Rosenfeld presents numerous theories in this paper. The most controversial
suggests that after law enforcement killings of young black men, residents of urban
minority neighborhoods have lost confidence in the police. "A loss of trust could make
residents of those places less likely to share information with law enforcement about
dangerous criminals. With a newfound sense of impunity, these criminals might have
begun committing even more crimes. And threatened by violence, neighbors might harm
themselves instead of going to the police for protection, the theory suggests." Max
Ehrenfreund, A new federal report discusses an unexpected theory for why murders are

rising

in

U.S.

cities,

WASH.

POST

(June

15,

2016),
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Rosenfeld,
[P]eople disagree about what that effect is. It could be about police
holding back, afraid they'll be criticized later for what they see as doing
their job. Or you could look at it from the opposite point of view: that it's
a matter of citizens - especially black people - losing faith in local
cops.98

Ultimately, it may be difficult to establish which factors have
contributed to the recent increase in violent crime. However, Professor
Rosenfeld's evidence seems to disprove popular speculation that
attributes increased urban homicides to a larger heroin market99 or to the
recent release of former prisonersiooand to unequivocally demonstrate a
significant increase in crime that correlates with the post-Ferguson
increase in public-police distrust.
3.

Ignoring the Evidence: The Black Lives Matter
Cases
The "Ferguson Effect" purports to link the recent increase in
homicides and other violent crime to media attention focusing on a series
of cases involving fatal police encounters, especially with young AfricanAmerican suspects, and their legal and social aftermath. But the social
impact of these cases is poorly communicated by the aggregated data.
Instead, it is enlightening to review the facts and circumstances of a few
recent cases - some of which received the media spotlight and galvanized
social protest - while others were virtually ignored.
Michael Brown: An unarmed 18-year-old shot to death on August
9, 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri by Police Officer Darren Wilson. Officer
Wilson was not indicted by the grand jury. ioi
Eric Garner: An unarmed 43-year-old died after being put in a
chokehold while being arrested for allegedly selling cigarettes on July 17,
2014. The event was captured on a cellphone video and Eric Garner can
be heard uttering his last words: "I can't breathe, I can't breathe." In
December, the grand jury declined to indict Officer Pantaleo, the officer

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/15/the-unexpected-way-theferguson-effect-might-be-causing-more-murder/.
98 Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 18.
99 Id. at 15.
100 Id. at 16.
ioi Fires, vandalism, gunfirefollow grandjury decision in Ferguson, NBC NEWS (Nov
24, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-decision-grand-jury-decides-not-tocharge-police-officer-darren-wilson-in-michael-brown/.
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who performed the illegal chokehold.102
Tamir Rice: A 12-year-old playing with a pellet gun in a park in
Cleveland Ohio, shot to death on November 22, 2014 by Police Officers
Loehmann and Garmback. Officers Loehmann and Garmback were not
indicted by the grand jury. 103
John CrawfordIII: A 22-year-old shot to death on August 5, 2014
in a Wal-Mart in Beavercreek, Ohio after picking up a BB gun in one of
the store aisles. The grand jury, which had access to photographic and
video evidence and heard from 18 witnesses, declined to indict any of the
police officers involved.104
Alex Nieto: A 27-year-old college student and security officer shot
to death on March 14, 2014 by four police officers who fired over 48
bullets. Mr. Nieto was sitting on a Bernal Heights Park bench in San
Francisco, California eating a burrito next to the Taser he carried for his
job. The officers were not indicted and a federal jury rejected the family's
claim for civil damages finding that the force used by the four officers
was not excessive.105
Christian Taylor: An unarmed 19 year-old shot to death on
August 7, 2015 by Police Officer Brad Miller at a car dealership in
Arlington, Texas. Officer Miller, a trainee, was not indicted by the grand

102 Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path
to
Eric
Garner's
Death,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
14,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-statenisland.html?_r=0.
103 Tim Stelloh, Report Questions TamirRice Grand Jury Proceedings, NBC NEWS (Jan.
21, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/report-raises-questions-about-tamirrice-grand-jury-n500851; Berman, supra note 8; Ben Mathis-Lilley, Report: Tamir Rice
Grand Jury Never Actually Voted on Whether to Indict Officers, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/theslatest/2016/01/20/report-tamir-rice-grand-jury-never
voted on indictment.html.
104 Mark Berman, No indictments after police shoot and kill man at an Ohio Wal-Mart;
Justice
Dept.
launches investigation, WASH.
POST
(Sept.
24,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/24/no-indictmentsafter-police-shoot-and-kill-man-at-an-ohio-wal-mart-justice-dept-launchesinvestigation/?utmterm=.ff21ff2e4093; Mark Gokavi, Special grand jury to get
evidence in Walmart shooting case, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2014),
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/crime-law/special-grand-jury-to-getevidence-in-walmart-shoo/nhQsD/.
1o5 Kale Williams et al., Jury in Nieto trialfinds SF cops did not use excessive force, S.F.
GATE (March 10, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Jury-in-Nieto-trial-find-

SF-cops-did-not-use-6882807.php.
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jury. 106
David Kassick: An unarmed 59-year-old shot to death on
February 2, 2015 in Hummelstown, Pennsylvania by Police Officer Lisa
Mearkle, after Kassick began running for unknown reasons. Mearkle, who
stunned Kassick four times with a Taser and shot him twice in the back,
was acquitted of all charges.107
John Hesselbein: An unarmed 32-year-old, was shot to death on
January 30, 2011 in Sacramento, California by Police Officer Paul
Beckham. Officer Beckham, who had arrested, handcuffed, and placed
Hesselbein into the back of his patrol car shot him in the face with his
rifle. After claiming self-defense, Officer Beckham was acquitted of all
charges.ios

Nicholas Thomas: A 23-year-old Goodyear employee shot to
death on March 24, 2015 in Cobb County, Georgia by Sergeant Kenneth
Owens. Sergeant Owens, who was attempting to serve a subpoena when
Thomas jumped into a customer's Maserati and began driving, was not
indicted by the grand jury. 109
Jonathan Santellana: An unarmed 17-year-old shot to death on
November 13, 2013 in Navasota, Texas by plainclothes off-duty Police
Officer Rey Garza after Santellana put his car in reverse and attempted to
flee. Officer Garza, who shot Santellana in the back seven times, was not
indicted by the grand jury. 110

106 Grand Jury declines to indict Arlington officerfor shooting teen at dealership,Fox 4
NEWS (June 8, 2016), http://www.fox4news.com/news/156025177 -story; Mitch
Mitchell, Fired Arlington officer not indictedfor killing Christian Taylor, Fr. WORTH
STAR-TELEG.
(June
8,
2016),
http://www.startelegram.com/news/local/community/arlington/article82558822.html.
107 Pennsylvania officer who fatally shot unarmed man in back cleared of murder, THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
5,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/nov/05/pennsylvania-officer-acquitted-murder-david-kassick; Ivey De Jesus,
Why
the jury acquitted Lisa Mearkle, PENN LivE
(Nov.
9,
2015),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2015/11/lisa mearkle verdictjury-acqu.h
tml.
ios Denny Walsh, Jury exonerates Elk Grove police officer in shooting, THE
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Nov.
18,
2015),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article45422316.html.
109 Mandi Milligan, Grand jury finds Smyrna officer justified in Nicholas Thomas

shooting, CBS46.COM (July 9, 2015), http://www.cbs46.com/story/29511972/grand-juryfinds-smyrna-officer-justified-in-nicholas-thomas-shooting?autostart=true.
110 Tom Abrahams, Navasota Officer Won't Face Chargesfor Fatally Shooting Teen,
ABC13.coM (Aug. 26, 2014), http://abcl3.com/news/navasota-officer-wont-facecharges-for-fatally-shooting-teen/281936/; James Pinkerton, Local Grand JuriesCleared

FALL 2016
FALI, 2016

MORENO
MIORENO

62

Vol. 21:2

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

The FBI does not keep records of "justifiable police
homicides,"iii so specific case narratives provide the only reliable
information about the nature of the current policing crisis. Unless the FBI
policy changes, estimating the number of police officers who are
unindicted or acquitted after deadly seizures or attempted seizures of
suspects will remain impossible.
4. Ignoring the Evidence: Policing the Police
The new Justice Department report confirms policing concerns
revealed through other recent research efforts. For example, a large study
conducted by the Pew Research Center immediately after Michael
Brown's 2014 death in Ferguson, Missouri, people asked whether the
public trusted the police to treat people equally, regardless of race. 112 At
the time, "46% of black respondents told Pew that they had "very little"
confidence in the police to do so. This was a significant shift from
previous survey results. In 2009, when Pew had asked the same question,
just one third of black respondents expressed similar policing concern.113
The growing body of empirical evidence of a policing crisis
includes proof of increased police misconduct at all levels. In recent
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of New York City's stop-andfrisk program,114 the federal district court developed extensive evidence
that New York City police officers routinely disregarded Fourth
Amendment rights and interfered with liberty interests for no reason or
based on racial or ethnic stereotypes and profiles.115 The data from New

Every Officer in Shooting cases last year, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Jan. 4, 2015),

http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Local-grandjuries-cleared-every-officer-in-5993700.php.
iii Taylor Kate Brown, The Cases Where U.S. Police have FacedKilling Charges, BBC
NEWS (April 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30339943.
112 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/26/ferguson-highlights-deepdivisions-between-blacks-and-whites-in-america/
113 Ehrenfreund, supra note 97.
114

Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 588.

115 New York City announced on January 31, 2014 that it would settle its long-running

legal fight over N.Y.P.D. stop and frisk practices and implement many of the specific
reforms identified in Judge Scheindlin's decision. Benjamin Weiser, Mayor Says New

York City Will Settle Suits on Stop and Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/3 1/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.
Mayor
Bill de Blasio's announcement was viewed as a dramatic reversal of the policies of the
previous administration, which had credited a drop in violent crime to the same stop-andfrisk practices. Id..; see also Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop and Frisk

Policy, N.Y.

TIMES

(Aug.

12,

2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-
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York also demonstrated that the law enforcement and community policing
benefits of an aggressive "stop and frisk" program were scant because
over the ten-year review period, only 1.5% of 4.4 million people stopped
were actually carrying weapons.116

C. Three Lessons from the Aggregated Evidence
The empirical evidence illuminates three problems plausibly
linked to a decade of Roberts Court's exclusion doctrine. First, the
evidence substantiates Justice Sotomayor's concern that the Court
"reward[s] manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of
the Constitution."117 Second, it revives Justice Blackmun's nearly fourdecade-old concern that the Court's suppression jurisprudence should not
"rest on untested predictions about police conduct."iis Third, it suggests
that the Court's repeated reluctance to publicly disavow aggressive
policing by suppressing evidence also is having an increasingly
deleterious effect on public-police trust.

IV. FLAGRANT

POLICE ABUSE AND THE DOCTRINE OF ATTENUATION

A. The Doctrine of Attenuation
As discussed above, in United States v. Strieff, the Court found
"no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly
unlawful police misconduct."119 However, the Court also held that the

judge-rules.html; Katherine Macfarlane, New York's Stop-and-Frisk Appeals are Still
Alive, BROOK.
L.
SCH.
PRACTICUM (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2370556
(essay exploring the
possible effects of Judge Scheindlin's decision): Similar examples can be found outside
of New York. . U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE
DEPARTMENT 4,
8
(2014),

http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2014/NPD%20Findings%20Report.p
df (finding that New Jersey Police Department stops have routinely violated the Fourth
Amendment).
116 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558 ("52% of all stops were followed by a protective
frisk for weapons. A weapon was found after 1.5% of these frisks. In other words, in
98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks, no weapon was found."), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25,
2013); David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionalityof Stop-and-Frisk
in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 124 (2013); Robert Gearty & Corky
Siemaszko, NYPD stop-and-frisk policy yielded 4.4 million detentions but few results:
study, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013), http:// www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypdstop-and-frisk-detains-millions-resultsarticle 1.1307179 (discussing Professor Jeffrey
Fagan's research revealing that only one-tenth of 1% of New York City stop-and-frisks
resulted in firearms confiscation from 2004 to June 30, 2012).
117 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *3,
iis Leon, 468 U.S. at 928.
119 Strieff, 579.U.S. at 9
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search at issue had been attenuated from the illegal seizure by subsequent
discovery of the outstanding warrant.12o This second rationale reflects an
obvious, if ultimately unpersuasive, effort to map its increasingly
stringent general suppression jurisprudence onto the preexisting, distinct,
and more particularized doctrine of attenuation.
1. The TraditionalDoctrine of Attenuation
The Supreme Court first explored the possibility that a prosecutor
might establish the attenuation of constitutional violation taint in 1963
in Wong Sun v. United States.121 In Wong Sun, which involved the
admissibility of two different statements, the Court held that statements
made immediately after the officers' unlawful entry should have been
excluded.122 However, statements made days later (after the suspect had
been released from custody and returned voluntarily to speak to the
police) had been properly admitted because "the connection between the
arrest and the statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."123 According to Justice Brennan:
We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree'
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions
of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.124
Under Wong Sun, prosecutors bore the full burden of proving
attenuation, by showing that the suspect's statement "was sufficiently an
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion."125
After Wong Sun, the Court did not address attenuation for the next 12
years.
See id.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
122 Id. at 487-88 ("We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree'
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.").
120
121

123 Id. at 491.

124 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Fruit that must be cast aside
includes not only evidence found by an illegal search but also evidence 'come at by
exploitation of that illegality."') (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
125 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
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In 1975, in Brown v. Illinois, the Court held unconstitutional an
Illinois statute creating a per se rule that Miranda warnings broke the
causal chain.126 But Brown provided more general guidance for
prosecutors seeking to argue attenuation.127 Echoing Wong Sun, the "apt"
attenuation question, according to the Brown Court, was "whether ... the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."128 According to Justice
Blackmun, who wrote for the Brown majority, "[it is entirely possible, of
course, as the State here argues, that persons arrested illegally frequently
may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial
illegality."129 But to break the causal chain, attenuation required
prosecution proof "not merely that the statement meet the Fifth
Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an act of
free will to purge the primary taint."130
The Brown Court relied on a totality of the circumstances
approach to conclude that the illegal arrest had tainted the suspect's
subsequent Mirandized statements.131 According to Justice Blackmun, in
the case at hand, the illegal arrest had been a patently lawless effort to
gather inculpatory evidence.
The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly
acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was for
investigation or for questioning. The arrest, both in design and in
execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this
expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.132
Under these circumstances, the fact that the suspect's statement
was taken nearly two hours after the arrest and in a different location did
not alter the Court's finding that "there was no intervening event of
significance whatsoever" or its decision to exclude the suspect's
statements as the poisoned fruit of his illegal seizure. 133
As Wong Sun and Brown illustrate, under traditional attenuation

126

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1975).

127
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

132

Id.

at 604.
at 599.
at 603.
at 602.
at 605.

133 Id. at 604.
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doctrine, the Court has balanced prosecution-proffered proof of
attenuation against defense proof of lasting constitutional taint. As was
the case in Brown, defendants seeking to rebut prosecution evidence of
attenuation could prevail by offering proof of patently illegal police abuse
of constitutional rights because courts provided with such proof were
instructed to suppress the evidence whenever "the impropriety of the
arrest was obvious."134 Notably missing from these cases is any
suggestion that defendants also bore the burden of proving the mental
culpability of the police officers who had engaged in the obvious and
remediable misconduct.
2. Reinterpreting the TraditionalDoctrine of
Attenuation
In Strieff, Justice Thomas concluded that Officer Fackrell's
"discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the
unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to arrest."135
The Strieff Court arrived at this conclusion by reducing the Court's
attenuation jurisprudence to a single case,136 misreading the case as
limited to three factors, and then solving the constitutional question
arithmetically. According to the Strieff majority, under Brown v. Illinois,
attenuation must be established by judicial assessment of: (1) temporal
proximity; (2) intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the police misconduct. 137
3. The Post-StrieffDoctrine of Attenuation
According to the Strieff Court, the first factor in the assessment of
attenuation of constitutional taint is a measure of the time that passes
"between the initially unlawful stop and the search."138 Here, because
Officer Fackrell discovered the contraband just a few minutes after the
illegal stop, considerations of temporal proximity favored suppression.139
Presumably, after Strieff, timing will remain a relevant attenuation
criterion.
When applying the second Brown factor, the Strieff Court

134
135
136

Id. at 605.
Strieff, 579 U.S. at *10 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 590).

137 Strieff, 579 U.S. at * 10 (noting that there were just "three factors articulated in Brown
v. Illinois:" (1) the "'temporal proximity' between the initially unlawful stop and the
search;" (2) "'the presence of intervening circumstances;"' and (3) "'the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.').
138 Id. at *6.
139

Id.
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embarked on a tortured reading of Segura v. Unites States. 140 According
to Justice Thomas, Segura supports the Strieff Court's conclusion that the
existence of an outstanding traffic warrant, although unknown to the
arresting officer at the time of the illegal seizure, was sufficient to
attenuate the constitutional taint created by the illegal seizure.141
This argument is wholly unpersuasive because Segura is entirely
distinct from Strieff. Segura, decided in 1984, involved illegal entry by
the police into a New York City apartment based on a suspicion of drug
deal, but without probable cause.142 The police officers, after arresting the
occupants, secured the apartment from within. The officers then sat in the
apartment and waited 19 hours for a search warrant. 143 Based on these
unusual facts, the Segura Court held that because the officers had
refrained from searching while inside the apartment until after the warrant
arrived, "the evidence first discovered [19 hours after the illegal entry] in
execution of the warrant was not a fruit of the illegal entry." 144 Given these
fact, it is hard to credit Justice Thomas's claim that cases are "similar" or
his argument that Segura demonstrated "that the existence of a valid
warrantfavors finding that the connection between unlawful conduct and
the discovery of evidence is 'sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint."'145 The Segura decision rested on the fact that the investigating
officers waited for a valid warrant to be obtained before beginning their
search. In fact, as Justice Sotomayor accurately observed, "[in Segura,
the agents' illegal conduct in entering the apartment had nothing to do
with their procurement of a search warrant."146 Thus, Segura should have
no bearing on Strieff where "the officer's illegal conduct in stopping
See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984).
141 As Justice Sotomayor said during oral argument:
What's going to stop police officers if we announce your rule ... [that] once we have
your name, if there's a warrant out on you, that's an attenuating circumstance under every
circumstance. What stops us from becoming a police state and just having the police stand
on every corner down here and stop every person, ask them for identification, put it
through, and if a warrant comes up, searching them?
Transcript
of
Oral
Argument
at
5,
Utah v.
Strieff,
579
U.S.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/14-1373_3d46.pdf.
140

142 Segura, 468 U.S. at 798.

143 Id. at 801.
144 Id. at 798.

Strieff, 579 U.S. at *7 (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 815).
146 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("In Segura, the agents' illegal conduct in entering the
apartment had nothing to do with their procurement of a search warrant. Here, the
officer's illegal conduct in stopping Strieff was essential to his discovery of an arrest
warrant.").
145
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Strieff was essential to his discovery of an arrest warrant."147 Justice
Thomas's misuse of Segura is fairly egregious; Segura would support

attenuation only in an alternate universe where Officer Fackrell refrained
from seizing Mr. Strieff until after he had gathered the reasonable
suspicion necessary for a lawful Terry stop.
4. Justice Breyer's Shifting View of the Doctrine of
Attenuation
Justice Breyer, prior to joining the Strieff majority, apparently
would have agreed that exclusion was warranted by the illegal seizure. In
2006, Justice Breyer notably interpreted Segura as follows: "[t]he relevant
fact about the warrant there was that it was lawfully obtained and arguably
set off an independent chain of events that led the police to seize the
evidence."148 Segura, in Justice Breyer's pre-Strieff view, would not
support attenuation where "there is no such independent event, or
intervening chain of events that would purge the [illegal] taint."149
However, a decade later Justice Thomas, with Justice Breyer now in tow,
finds attenuated taint based, not on an independent event, but on the
immediately subsequent discovery of an unrelated traffic warrant
unknown to the police officer at the time of the illegal seizure. Justice
Sotomayor denounces the majority's attenuation bait and switch because
the "warrant check . .. was not an 'intervening circumstance' separating
the stop from the search for drugs . .. [if] [it was part and parcel of the
officer's illegal expedition for evidence in the hope that something might
turn up."i5o

5.

The Rise of FlagrantPolice Abuse in the Doctrineof
Attenuation
The third Brown factor cited by the Strieff majority, was the
purposeful flagrancy of the police conduct. Here the Court found that
Officer Fackrell's unlawful decision to seize Mr. Strieff without
reasonable suspicion was a "good-faith mistake"151 that was "at most
negligent."152 The assessment of flagrancy was a not-so-subtle attempt to
map the current Court's flagrant police abuse suppression standard onto
preexisting attenuation doctrine. This component of the analysis also
provided an opportunity for the Court to double down on its narrow
147

Id.

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
150 Strieff, 579 U.S. at *5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148

149

151

Id. at *2.

152

Id.
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definition of remediable Fourth Amendment violations. After Strieff,
defense proof of intentional or mentally culpable police misconduct is
required for suppression and the same virtually insurmountable burden of
proof has been allocated to defendants seeking to rebut a prosecutor's
argument of attenuated taint.
The Strieff majority used two distinct rhetorical strategies in its
effort to harmonize the flagrant police abuse standard with traditional
attenuation doctrine. First, on the facts, the Court simply accepted the
prosecution's conclusions, despite substantial contradictory evidence.
According to Justice Thomas, Officer Fackrell was merely negligent. 153
The facts do not support this conclusion. Officer Fackrell was
investigating an anonymous tip of unknown reliability. During his
intermittent surveillance of the suspected drug house, Officer Fackrell had
failed to observe Mr. Strieff enter so, as he candidly acknowledged, he
"lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that Strieff was a short-term visitor
who may have been consummating a drug transaction."154 Without
waiting to develop reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop, Officer Fackrell
simply seized Mr. Strieff hoping that he could exploit the unlawful
detention to "find out what was going on [in] the house."155 The evidence,
on its face, cannot support a finding of mere negligence. Second, on the
law, Justice Thomas purported to rely on Brown for his legal finding of
negligent police error.156 But as shown above, the Brown Court had
clearly held that the sine qua non of remediable police misconduct is proof
that "factors relied on by the police in determining to make the arrest were
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable."157 In Brown, as in Strieff, "the
impropriety of the arrest was obvious ... [because] the purpose of [the
police officers'] action was 'for investigation' or for 'questioning' rand]
[t]he arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory."1ss Thus,
Brown could not plausibly support attenuation in Strieff because Officer

154

Id.
Id.

1ss

Id.

153

Id. at *7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (The majority also posits that the officer could
not have exploited his illegal conduct because he did not violate the Fourth Amendment
on purpose. Rather, he made "good faith mistakes." Never mind that the officer's sole
purpose was to fish for evidence. The majority casts his unconstitutional actions as
"negligent" and therefore incapable of being deterred by the exclusionary rule.").
157 Brown, 422 U.S. at 610-11.
iss Id. at 605.
156
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Fackrell admittedly "embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the
hope that something might turn up."159
The Strieff Court's attempt to map its flagrant police abuse
standard onto traditional attenuation doctrine reflects an effort to ensure
that future illegal seizures and searches will be irremediable. Strieff
guided courts to simply assume police negligence, regardless of the facts.
As Justice Sotomayor predicted:
What's going to stop police officers if we announce your rule ... [that]
once we have your name, if there's a warrant out on you, that's an
attenuating circumstance under every circumstance. What stops us from
becoming a police state and just having the police stand on every corner
down here and stop every person, ask them for identification, put it
through, and if a warrant comes up, searching them?160If Justice
Sotomayor is correct, as more prosecutors successfully argue attenuation,
aggressive policing will be further incentivized.
6. The (Not So) Mysterious Omission of Hudson v.
Michigan
Strieff is notably not the first Roberts Court decision to address
attenuation. A decade ago, in Hudson v. Michigan,161 the Court expanded
traditional attenuation doctrine in a case involving police officers'
knowing violation of the constitutional "knock and announce" search
warrant rule.162 According to Justice Scalia, who wrote for the Hudson
majority, a search that occurred just seconds after the officers' unlawful
entry was nevertheless attenuated because "[w]hether that preliminary
misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant
they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside
the house."163 After Hudson, prosecutors could successfully argue
attenuation by proving that the purposes of a constitutional safeguard
would not be served by exclusion of the evidence.164
Given the bloated scope of attenuation after Hudson, the case
unexpectedly played no real role in the Strieff Court's attenuation analysis
and was cited just twice by the majority. First, for the now perfunctory
Strieff, 579 U.S. at *4 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. _(No. 14-1373)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/14-1373_3d46.pdf.
161 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586.(2006).
162 Id. at 589.
163 Id. at 592.
159

160

164

Id. at 593.
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suppression balance-of-interest qualification that the remedy is
"applicable only . .. where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial
social costs."165 Second, to support the Court's conclusion that
"[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional
police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained."'166 In fact, the second citation was
actually altered to decrease its precedential weight. Hudson did not, as
Justice Thomas suggested, simply adopt the historical broken causal chain
limitation on attenuation.167 Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the Hudson
majority, had dramatically expanded attenuation by inventing a sort of
"interest attenuation" that occurs "when, even given a direct causal
connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained."168
The somewhat mysterious demotion of Hudson may be best
explained by Justice Breyer's appearance as a member of the Strieff
majority. A decade earlier, in his dissent in Hudson, Justice Breyer had
argued-in the very sentence now quoted in Strieff - that "the majority
gives the word 'attenuation' a new meaning."169 A decade ago, Justice
Breyer had been outraged that Justice Scalia's interest attenuation
denigrated the constitutional interests at stake and ignored the Court's
long history of excluding evidence even when the "evidence or its
possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons underlying the
unconstitutionality of a search."17o At the time, Justice Breyer advanced a
more traditional attenuation approach noting that "what this Court's
precedents have typically used that word to mean[,] .. . [required] that the

discovery of the evidence come about long after the unlawful behavior
took place or in an independent way, i.e., through means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."171 In an extreme
reversal in Strieff, Justice Breyer has apparently overcome his previous

165
166
167
168

Strieff, 579 U.S. at *4 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591).
Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593.
Id.

169 Id. at 620.

Id. at 621 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 619-20 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U. S. at 487-88 and Brown, 422 U. S. at 603604).
170
171
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fear that the Court was expanding its attenuation doctrine to swallow the
exclusionary rule.
V. CONCLUSION: JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AND THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE
BRANDEIS

A. A Shared Concern with Judicial Integrity and the Court's
Socio-Normative Role
Over the past eight years the Roberts Court has been recalibrating
the balance of safety and liberty by redefining remediable Fourth
Amendment violations. These developments trouble Justice Sotomayor,
who has opined that "[t]he exclusionary rule . . . keeps courts from being
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions."172 In her view, when courts concerned with judicial integrity
"admit only lawfully obtained evidence, they encourage those who
formulate law enforcement polices, and the officers who implement them,
to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system."173
According to Justice Sotomayor, the current Court risks its integrity
because "when courts admit illegally obtained evidence as well, they
reward manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution." 174
These concerns echo the decisions of Justice Louis D. Brandeis.
In his 2016 autobiography, Professor Jeffrey Rosen opined that Justice
Brandeis's perpetual popularity - especially among civil libertarians - is
most directly attributable to his robust views on the norm of judicial
integrity.175 Nearly a century before Justice Sotomayor, Justice Brandeis
opined that the role of the Court was to lead and educate by normative
example. In his famous dissent in Olmstead,176 Justice Brandeis
illuminated his conceptualization of the fundamental principle of judicial
integrity.
The governing principle has long been settled; a court will not
redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. The

Strieff, 579 U.S. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
174 Id. (citations omitted).
175 JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIs D BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET (JEWISH LIVES)195 (2016).
("Brandeis's hour seems to be coming around at last ... In a poll of leading libertarian
and civil libertarian scholars and judges by Reason Magazine, the libertarian journal of
ideas, four of the fourteen respondents identified Brandeis as their favorite Supreme
Court justice, largely because of his dissenting opinion in U.S. v Olmsted.").
172

173

176

Id.
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maxim of unclean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle
prevails also in courts of law . . . Where the government is the actor, the

reasons for applying it are even more persuasive. Where the remedies
invoked are those of the criminal law, the reasons are compelling ....
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen.177
Justice Brandeis retired from the Court a quarter century before
Mapp v. Ohio178 was decided. But the reasoning of Mapp, the apotheosis
of Fourth Amendment protection, resonates with typical Brandeisian
themes. According to Mapp:
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the state
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having
once recognize that the right to privacy embodied in the
fourth amendment is enforceable against the states, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of
privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in
origin, we could no longer permit that right to remain an
empty promise.179
In fact, the Mapp Court cited Justice Brandeis in its most famous
passage: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, disregard of the charter of its own
existence."iso Today, the task of reminding the nation that improper
government reliance on the poisoned fruit of police illegality harms the
citizenry by destroying privacy and corrupting the moral authority of our
police, prosecutors, and courts falls to Justice Sotomayor, an intellectual
heir to Justice Brandeis's legacy.
B. Justice Sotomayor and the Modern Court

177
178
179

iso

Id.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1991).
Id. at 660.

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 ("As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v.
United States, 'Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example .... If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy."')
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Over the past half century, the Court has adopted an increasingly
utilitarian approach to the protection of constitutional rights and liberties.
The current micro-focus on deterrence side steps the Brandeisian moral
imperative that courts educate by example when they abjure illegallyseized evidence. The Roberts Court suppression doctrine, which
increasingly and narrowly links suppression to deterrence of mentally
culpable law-breaking police officers, discourages consideration of
broader objectives.
While philosophically aligned with Justice Brandeis on the moral
and educational role of the judiciary, Justice Sotomayor is more of a
pragmatist. She understands that a criminal justice system also loses
legitimacy on the streets when police officers engage in abusive and
disparate treatment with impunity. As the growing empirical evidence
discussed above demonstrates, the Roberts Court cannot plausibly
continue to operate on the demonstrably false premise that policing is
fungible across socio-economic, ethnic/racial, or geographic lines.
The effects of aggressive policing are disproportionately felt in
urban, poor, and minority communities.isi Alone on the Court, Justice
Sotomayor confronts the mounting evidence that police officers do not
equally protect and serve all people or each community.
It is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of
this type of scrutiny. For generations, black and brown parents have given
their children "the talk"- instructing them never to run down the street;
always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of
talking back to a stranger-all out of fear of how an officer with a gun
will react to them. By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and
innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says
that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of
your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the
subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.182
It is entirely possible that, as the Roberts Court wields its power
to the short-term benefit of police and prosecutors, it will disrupt or
destroy efforts aimed at long-term policing progress. Strieff now
empowers the police to use illegal stops and seizures as a routine
investigatory tool, especially in neighborhoods where outstanding

isi Strieff, 579 U.S. at *12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
182

Id.
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warrants are "surprisingly common."183 If these practices continue or
increase, police aggression, including the deadly police encounters at
issue in the Black Lives Matter cases, will destroy the community trust
necessary to achieve public peace and safety, which should be law
enforcement's primary objective.
Justice Sotomayor is an increasingly effective advocate for a
constitutional criminal jurisprudence that accommodates both theory and
practice. Her unique voice serves as a powerful reminder that rights are
not abstractions but everyday safeguards against police overreach. Her
robust and realistic approach to policing problems rejects traditional
academic distinctions between "procedural" rules of evidence and
"substantive" questions of constitutional law that impede our
understanding of how law works to identify, constrain, and remedy police
abuse of constitutional rights. Solutions, as she recognizes, must bridge
this divide.
In the near and distant future, courts will need new tools and
models to assess the scope and boundaries of Fourth Amendment
protections-e specially as we store private information in manners
unimaginable just a decade ago. Judges will also need practical rules and
standards to govern the allocation and quantification of burdens of proof,
the assessment of evidence of police abuse of rights, and the application
of the remedy of suppression. Policing the police requires an evidencebased understanding of how police officers treat suspects and how courts
really work. The Roberts Court appears to have instead chosen an eyes
wide shut approach to the protection of Fourth Amendment rights which
rewards aggressive police practices and risks the lives of some and the
privacy of all.

183 Id. at 7 ("The States and Federal Government maintain databases with over 7.8
million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor
offenses.").

